FROM EDN EUROPE: London, 7th July 2005

I am writing this column in the hours following the terrorist attacks in London on 7th July. It is a sad observation that vulnerability to such events has become a fact of life pretty well everywhere that this magazine circulates, and indeed in most places that the wider family of EDN titles is distributed across the world. It may, however, be worth a moment's reflection on what the terrorists did not do, in and to London.

Over the past few years, and especially since the destruction of the World Trade Center, we have from time to time heard speculation around the undoubted fact that the perpetrators of these attacks are single-mindedly bent on causing the maximum disruption possible to our way of life and the systems that underpin our societies. Thus, we have heard lurid stories to the effect that the terrorists would be equipping themselves with the means of assaulting the financial systems of the Western world. Our stock markets and banks, just as much as our fellow citizens, would be the targets and might be brought to their knees by a suitably crafted virus, worm, or some other assault on the IT infrastructure.

I must of course acknowledge the possibility that the terrorist faction has indeed been pursuing its aims by high-tech methods, but that it has been thwarted by the security services in covert operations that remain hidden from view. As I have no means of knowing whether that is the case, I have to set that possibility on one side. However, the various other "exotic" threats that have been widely trailed—"dirty" bombs, biological agents, and all their alarming kin—have not made any appearance either.

The technology that caused so much death and injury in London, as it did in Madrid, was not of the 21st century—in fact, it long pre-dates the 20th. Just a quantity of chemical explosive, placed among those who were not expecting it. And yet, there are odd twists that label the event as being of our time. Camera cell phones are now so common that anyone who captured any part of the event as a digital image is being invited to email it to the investigators.

The continuing—and, we must now assume, heightened—threat to all our cities will, in a somewhat macabre way, probably lead to some increased business for some of our readers. Spending on security equipment is bound to tick up—there has already been newspaper speculation about the possible introduction of some sort of scanning technology at Underground stations in London. In reality, even if that were put in place, it would do little to counter the threat. The methods used in these attacks invariably target open and vulnerable areas of our life—if we make access to any particular target that little bit more difficult, the terrorist merely diverts his attentions elsewhere. Our lives offer them a rich assortment of "elsewheres"—that being exactly the point: insofar as the perpetrators appear to want anything specific, it is that we cease living as we do.

Following such events, there is always a thread of newspaper coverage celebrating the courage of everyday people as they return to their routine, refusing to be intimidated. While that is undoubtedly true, and much to be applauded, it is also correct that the self-same lifestyle so hated by the terrorists gives most of us little choice; there is a routine to be got on with, and bills to be paid. Like, I suspect, many other travellers, when I embark on London's transport system next week, I will do so with some small degree of unease, while placing my faith in simple statistics. In a big city, the chances of being involved in any particular event are small. But telling yourself that on any given day you are at far more risk from the traffic and the street crime does little to reduce the horror of what befell those caught up in the Underground and bus bombings.

To any of our readers involved in the design and execution of technology fixes for the vulnerabilities of our lifestyle; go to it. Make them as effective as they possibly can be; meantime, the rest of us will carry on as before because in reality there's little else to be done. It has become a cliché, but it is no less true for that; there is no such thing as comprehensive security in an open society, and no technology cure-all.