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DPA tools and FPGA hacking vulnerability

December 10, 2009

 The growing use of FPGAs in FIPS-140 applications, particularly in modules using mezzanine card formats, has sparked a growing interest in assuring the cryptographic security of an FPGA that implements keys in bulk encryption or digital signature applications. Our coverage in late October of the Virtex and Spartan involvement in SASEBO-GII (Sidechannel Attack Standard Evaluation Board) designs in Japan spurred interest from the developers at Cryptography Research Inc., who have spent a decade looking at vulnerabilities in smart cards that resulted from attempts to extract keys through analysis of a device’s power dissipation.

You heard right, two levels of power analysis employed by hackers – simple power analysis and differential power analysis (DPA) – can allow extraction of keys from simple monitoring of the power consumed by active microcontrollers used in smart cards. Cryptography Research spent years developing signal-processing techniques to offer on-chip countermeasures for ASICs and controllers. The company also offers a CryptoFirewall IP core and a DPA Workstation for those wanting to conduct detailed DPA studies in-house.

Benjamin Jun, vice president of technology at CR, said that his company has spent several months informally discussing power analysis of FPGAs with both FPGA vendors and their customers in high-security vertical markets. The company has worked with Japan’s National Institute of Advanced Industrial Science and Technology to insure compatibility of its tools with the SASEBO FPGA testing environment. 

Of course, using DPA to extract keys from complex products like microcontrollers and FPGAs suggests the method is at least partially useful in performing rudimentary reverse engineering on complex logic devices. That is one impetus for Cryptography Research’s ongoing discussions with the Trusted Computing Group alliance, particularly in realms of device security surrounding the group’s Trusted Platform Module.

Jun stressed that the company is still in its initial stages of studying adjunct logic blocks that could be added to an FPGA design to serve the same countermeasure role that is now standard in smart cards.  But as the FIPS 140-3 federal standards for secure computing move into final approval stages, the threat is moving upstream into more complex devices, such as high-end FPGAs.

Posted by Loring Wirbel on December 10, 2009 | Comments (10)

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January 11, 2010
In response to: DPA tools and FPGA hacking vulnerability
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December 31, 2009
In response to: DPA tools and FPGA hacking vulnerability
Larbides commented:

Alan: it turns out that there are some mathematical properties of crypto that make make it possible to find keys from extremely noisy measurements. Even if a lot of noise is put in, with more operations being measured the noise can be filtered out. The wikipedia article on differential power analysis gives some info. Nonsense: it's not clear from the article whether power analysis is being used to analyze loaded logic or bitfiles or both. If the crypto used in the bitfile loading could be broken with power analysis, then the entire design would be revealed and all security on that kind of FPGA would be completely toast. (This would be a major problem for all kinds of designs.) If it's an issue for loaded logic, then I agree this would mainly be limited to designs that use crypto.


December 22, 2009
In response to: DPA tools and FPGA hacking vulnerability
Nonsense commented:

Unless your design does little more than crypto, you aren't learning jack from power analysis.


December 21, 2009
In response to: DPA tools and FPGA hacking vulnerability
Alan commented:

I cant see what the problem is, other than maybe naive designers and specifiers. Power disipation, or supply current analysis has been known about for over 30 years. I have an expired patent for its use in reliability investigation work. If you know it can be done what is the problem with having extra spoofing circuitry that cloaks the power draw. It is not straightforward but its not rocket science either.


December 21, 2009
In response to: DPA tools and FPGA hacking vulnerability
hi commented:

I disagree with Tech4life. I think FIPS/NIST is intentionally specified and designed with vulnerabilities in mind. To make a secure design, one must implement both the standard and the "extra" know-how. The naive designer (oxymoron) would leave the back door open as indicated in this article. If we truly behaved in a manner that indicated that security were an objective, plain text would never exist in e-mail, blogs, or nearly any other communication exchange.


December 11, 2009
In response to: DPA tools and FPGA hacking vulnerability
Tech4life commented:

It's about time that FIPS/NIST give the chip manufacturers of TPM's and FPGA's a firm nudge to deal with security vulnerabilities like DPA. These are REAL attacks folks! The USA is falling woefully behind the rest of the world on secure semiconductor design...

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